

We will see how the three levels unambiguously advocate in favor of the “unhealthy” view.įirst, at the statistical level, most conspiracy theories are false. In this paper, we will evaluate these two positions at a (1) statistical, (2) epistemological, and (3) empirical (psychological) level. This conspiracy theory accused US and UK armies to have invaded Iraq in 2003, not as they claim because of the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction - which were finally not found, and led the US and UK governments to recognize their “error” - but in reality, to gain control on a strategic region for oil industry.įor the “unhealthy” view, conspiracy theories are mainly false, often delusional, having negative social consequences, and favored by faulty reasoning (cognitive biases). Its main argument is that the conspiracy theory about US/UK Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has finally been proven true. Healthy and Unhealthy Views on Conspiracy TheoriesĪccording to the “healthy” view, we should consider each conspiracy theory on its own merits (particularism), and not discard all of them as non-rational beliefs (generalism), given that some conspiracies have been uncovered in history (Watergate, MK-Ultra, Tuskegee experiments, etc.). įrom this discussion, and other debates about the nature and definition of conspiracy theories, it seems that the disagreement may be very simply put: It opposes the “healthy” view on conspiracy theories held by Basham and Dentith (and others Basham cites Peter Knight, Gina Husting, Martin Orr, Kurtis Hagen, David Coady, Jack Bratich and Charles Pigden, plus some European social psychologists ), and the “unhealthy” or “pathologizing” view held by the majority of psychologists (Viren Swami, Robert Brotherton, Jan-Willem, Van Prooijen, Karen Douglas, our team in France and Switzerland, etc.) and some sociologists (Jovan Byford, Joseph Uscinski, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Gérald Bronner, Pierre-André Taguieff, etc.) working in the field. We once responded to their critics, and we would like here to add some additional arguments, in order to evaluate the relevance of the concept of “healthy conspiracy theories”. There, we worried about French governmental and local initiatives aimed at fighting the proliferation of conspiracy theories (CT) among youths, in a context of terrorist attacks, and subsequent ethnic and religious tensions. Since 2016, Basham, Dentith and colleagues have, on several occasions, reacted in the Journal Social Epistemology to our call “Let’s fight conspiracy theories effectively”, published in a French daily. Image by PJ Nelson via Flickr / Creative Commons


One must never forget the ideological aspects of conspiracy thinking.
